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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Sunday Laws and
Laundromat Patrons
The Sunday laws of New York State,' a
recurring and controversial topic, were
given a further exception recently in the
case of People v. Aliprantis.2 The Appellate Division in this case reversed a conviction of the defendant for violation of section 21433 of the Penal Law and held that
a laundromat patron does not violate the
over-all intent of the Sabbath Law, 4 since
the washing of one's personal laundry on
Sunday is not proscribed labor because it is
a work of necessity.
Sabbath, laws are basically an evolution
from the Old Testament, wherein it was
commanded to keep holy the Sabbath. 5
Typical examples of the development of
such laws are: an edict of Constantine the
Great in 321 A.D., commanding all inhabitants of cities to rest on a certain day; a
statute of Edward III in 1354 by*which the
sale of wool on Sunday as a staple was forbidden in England. 6 Carried over to the
American colonies, such legislation had for
most jurisdictions a twofold objective: 1)
to protect the security of religious observ-

ance, and 2) to provide a day of rest for the
worker. 7 Although essentially religious in
origin, such legislation is upheld today as
a valid exercise of the police power, the
public health making necessary a mandatory day of rest.8 It has also been held that
such laws do not infringe upon the theory
of separation of Church and State, since it
is not legislation "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
The New York legislation on this subject
is found in Article 192 of the Penal Law.
The foundation of this article is seen in
section 2140 which recognizes Sunday as a
day of rest and prohibits "the doing on
that day of certain acts hereinafter specified, which are serious interruptions of the
repose and religious liberty of the community." Subsequent sections of the Article
contain specific prohibitions, sections 2143
and 2146 covering respectively the broad
areas of "labor" and "trades." There is an
exception added to both areas, however,
allowing each, if they can be classified as
"works of necessity or charity." It is with
these sections, constructed with broad and
7 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 260 (July 1956).

1 N. Y. PENAL LAW art. 192.
2

8 App. Div. 2d 276, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 477 (1st Dep't

1959).

N. Y. PENAL LAW §2143, prohibiting labor, with
the exception of works of charity or necessity.
4 N. Y. PENAL LAW §2140, establishing "the first
day of the week," Sunday, as a day of rest.
3

5 Exodus 16:23-30; Leviticus 23:8-21.
6 21 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 565 (1951).

These
objectives can be seen in Section 2140 of the

N. Y.

PENAL LAW.

For the historical background

of Sunday legislation see generally Johnson,
Sunday Legislation, 23 KY. L.J. 131 (1934).
8

Petit v. Minnesota,

177 U.S. 164

(1900);

People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 43 N.E. 541

(1895).
amend. I. See People v. Friedman,
302 N.Y. 75, 79, 96 N.E. 2d 184, 186 (1950).

9 U. S. CONST.
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elastic' terminology, that many of the problems arise.
The defendant in the instant case was
charged with performing "labor" on Sunday as proscribed by the statute. In reversing his conviction, the Appellate Division
first considered the "expenditure of energy"
as a test to exclude the defendant's actions
from the coverage of the term "labor."
Automatic washing machines, it was reasoned, are in fact laborsaving. The Court
also recognized the necessity in many instances of doing personal laundry on Sunday and doing it in laundromats, individuals
such as Aliprantis perhaps having no other
opportunity and, very probably, no other
facilities.
The somewhat inconsistent application
of the statute can be seen, however, by
comparing the reasoning of the Aliprantis
case with a decision of the same court
several days earlier. In the case of People
v. Kaplan,10 the defendant was the proprietor of a laundromat, convicted of violating
section 2146 of the Penal Law which prohibits all trades not deemed works of necessity. Reasoning that "necessity" does not
refer only to a necessity on behalf of the
proprietor, it would seem logical that if the
washing of one's laundry on Sunday in a
laundromat be a necessity (as stated in the
Aliprantis decision),, the proprietor should
also be excepted from the statute's application.1' Recognizing that there can be no
general rule as to what constitutes a work
of necessity, the court in the Kaplan case
met this proposition by considering the
10 8 App. Div. 2d 163, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 673 (1st
Dep't 1959).
11 An example of this reasoning may be seen in

the case of a drug store. While the proprietor may
not deem it a necessity to remain open, he may
do so as it is a necessity to others.

washing in this case as a convenience rather
than as a necessity. It was further held that
the defendant, Kaplan, was engaged in conducting a trade, although he was not
physically on the premises at the time of
the violation. The fact that the defendant's
store was open, and that he was receiving
income, would appear to make this conclusion obvious. Yet a further inconsistency
in the statute's application can be seen in
the case of People v. Welt. 2 In that case,
on precisely the same issue, the court held
that the proprietor, although his store was
open and patrons were using his machines,
could not be guilty of conducting a trade
because he was not physically present at
the time. Returning to the Kaplan case,
once the defendant's actions were found to
be classifiable under section 2146 as a
"trade," the court found no need to consider
section 2140 as to whether the trade was a
serious interruption to the repose of the
community.
In the interpretation and application of
the statute there seems to be too much
room for the use of an individual justice's
discretion. It also appears possible that the
Sabbath laws are in danger of being used
by individuals as an economic weapon.'
Such varied and arbitrary enforcement
stands as little credit to the State's statutory
legislation. The problem was succinctly
stated by Governor Thomas E. Dewey in
his 1952 annual message to the Legislature
where he stated: "There are many incongruities and examples of disparate treatment. Many activities which do not interfere with the religious repose of the
community are prohibited by existing law.
14 Misc. 2d 275, 178 N.Y.S. 2d 313 (Nassau
County Ct. 1958).
13 See City of Elizabeth v. Windsor-Fifth Ave.
Inc., 31 N.J. 187, 106 A. 2d 9 (App. Div. 1959).
12

5

There is need for a careful re-examination
of these provisions."'1 4 The problem,
admittedly requiring the most tactful handling, has to this date not been met. Amendments to the Sabbath laws are perennial
subjects before the New York Legislature,' 5
but with few exceptions proposals in this
area appear to die in committee, perhaps
because of possible religious ramifications
and the antiquity of our Sabbath laws. 16
One of the foremost proponents of a
change is Senator Rosenblatt, Democrat
from Kings County. Among the Senator's
1959 proposals was an amendment to section 2144 of the Penal Law making it a
defense to a prosecution for conducting
business on the first day of the week that
the defendant keeps another day as holy
time and does not conduct business on
that day, providing such business does not
interrupt or disturb another person in holy
7
time observance.'
A second proposal of the Senator would
be an amendment allowing the New York
City Council to regulate the conduct of
business by inhabitants of the city who ob8
serve another day of rest as holy time.'
A third and widely proposed plan would
be a "one-day-in-seven" 1aw," in place of
14 Annual Message of the Governor, N. Y. Sess.
Laws 1952, 1300.
15 See, e.g., N. Y. LEG. INDEXES 1958-59. Reference to these and to indexes of other years will
reveal a number of proposals on the subject of
Sunday Laws.
16 This is obvious from the number of proposalsmade on the subject of Sunday Laws each year,
note 15 supra, and the absence of actual changes.
See, e.g., N. Y. Sess. Laws 1953, 2177, where a
Sunday Law amendment was vetoed because of
the extreme divergency of existing views.
17 Sen. Intro. 2277, N. Y. LEG. INDEX 1959.

Is Sen. Intro. 1836, N. Y.

LEG. INDEX

1958.

19 Note, Sunday Blue Laws: An Analysis of their
Position in Our Society, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 505,
520 (1958).
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Article 192 of the Penal Law, making one
day of rest mandatory for the workers, but
leaving the selection of that day to individual discretion.
This last suggestion would apparently
achieve the same end as both of the Senator's proposals but gives no consideration
to the extant religious aspect of the problem.
As to the Senator's proposals, the qualifications attached to the broadening of the
alternate holy day defense appear to be an
equitable solution and in accord with the
intentions of section 2140. It is suggested,
however, that an interruption to another's
religious observance and repose need not
come only in the concrete form of a physical interruption. In an area of keen competition, a businessman may find his repose
greatly disturbed and therefore fail in his
religious observance through knowledge
that a competitor is open for business because he observes another day of rest. Economic pressure can be as much a disturbance to one's repose as would be a loud
and raucous undertaking. To answer that
such a businessman would be free by law
to change his day of rest would again ignore the religious aspect of the problem.
Perhaps the sounder approach lies in the
Senator's second proposal. The first day of
the week has been protected by legislation
not in deference to any particular religious
sect, but to conform to the day respected as
the Sabbath by the majority of citizens. The
day could therefore be varied according
to the majority's religious sentiment in a
particular trade or locale, and if such variation did not substantially affect the repose
of the community, Sabbath laws could be
delegated to the realm of municipal government. Regulations instituted on this level
could still achieve the ends sought by sec-
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tion 2140 of the Penal Law.
The Aliprantis20 decision involves an
open question as to whether the defendant
performed "labor" in the use of the washing
machine. Courts have said that a proprietor
performed labor by turning on the lights of
a store and starting his machines. 21 Whether
such actions are a necessity on Sunday for
anyone is a matter of individual conscience
which cannot be touched by the most stringent or lenient of man-made laws.
Since proper Sabbath observance is a
matter of conscience, it is not suggested that
Christanity will suffer by the abolition of
such legislation. Such laws, however, while
carrying out a valid exercise of the police
power and protecting the security of the
majority's religious observance, also stand
as a reinforcement of this country's Christian foundation. With valid reasons for upholding them, and with the possibility of a
just and practical enforcement of them on
a local basis, the problem is not met hon22
estly by their complete abolition.
Privileged Disclosures to a Clergnyman
Communications between clergyman and
penitent pose the problem of weighing two
mutually exclusive but desirable objectives.
The court is forced to evaluate the importance of the evidence to the judicial process
against possible detriments to the religious
8 App. Div. 2d 276, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 477 (1st
Dep't 1959).
21 People v. Rubenstein, 182 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Ct.
20

Spec. Sess. 1959).

"Justice and reason forbid a state to be atheistic or to be what comes to the same thing as being
22

community, and specifically, detriment to
the secrecy of the confessional. In a recent
case before the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals,' the defendant was convicted
of abusing and wilfully misusing her children. During the course of the trial a Lutheran minister who had been called as a
character witness testified that the defendant
had come to his office in an effort to receive
communion. The minister told her that he
could not give her communion unless she
confessed. He then stated that she did
confess to chaining her children, and the
minister advised her that this was sinful.
The conviction was reversed on other
grounds, but two of the three judges expressed the thought that the minister's
testimony was inadmissible. While there
was no statute specifically governing this
point of admissibility the judges relied on
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that
the admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be
governed, except when an Act of Congress
or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States
2
in the light of reason and experience.
There has been considerable debate as
to whether or not information revealed
during confession was privileged at common
law. It is highly probable that, considering
the close relationship between the Church
and the State in pre-Reformation England,
the sacredness of the confessional seal was
never doubted. 3 Perhaps this is the reason
why there are no cases reported from that

atheistic, to have the same attitude towards various so-called 'religions' and indifferently to grant
the same rights to all of them." Leonis XtIT Pontificis Maxima Acta, V, 123; quoted in BAIERL,
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE MODERN STATE

I Mullen v. United States, 263 F. 2d 275 (D. C.

223 (1955).

13

Cir. 1958).
R. CRIM. P. 26. See Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U. S. 604, 614 (1953).
3 See NOLAN, The Law of the Seal of Confession,
2 FED.

CATHOLIC ENCYC.

649, 652 (special ed. 1912).

5
period dealing with this problem. 4
Since the Restoration, however, it appears that the English courts have not recognized this privilege.5 It has been pointed
out that there have been few instances in
which a priest was actually compelled to
disclose a statement made to him in confession," and in fact when the English cases
were considered in New York by Mayor
De Witt Clinton in 1813, in the case of
People v. Phillips,7 he distinguished those
cases which seem to deny the privilege and
found no express adjudication in the English Courts.8 Many cases in dicta, however,
have argued against any such privilege. 9
In the United States, thirty-seven states
have enacted statutes establishing such a
privilege.' Where there is no statute, how4 Ibid.

See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2394 (3d

ed. 1940).
5 8 WIGMORE, op.

cit. supra note 4.

0 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 219, comment

(1942).
7 This case was never officially reported. For an
excerpt of the opinion see 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER
199 (1955).
8 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 199, 204 (1955).
9 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Le Marchant, [1881] 17
Ch. D. 675 (dictum); Greenlaw v. King, 1 Beav.
137, 48 Eng. Rep. 891 (Q. B. 1838) (dictum);
Anonymous, Skinner 404, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.
B. 1693) (dictum).
10ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §58-6-5 (1949);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-2233 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §28-606 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE ANN. §1881 (3) (West 1958); COLO. REV.
(1953); FLA. LAWS
STAT. ANN. §153-1-7 (3)
1959, ch. 144; GA. CODE ANN.§38-419.1 (1954);
HAWAII REV. LAWS §222-20 (1955); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §9-203 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1714
(1946); IOWA CODE ANN. §622.10 (1950); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-2805 (1949); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §421.210 (4) (1955); LA. REV. STAT.
§15: 477,478 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §13
(1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS §617.61 (1948);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §595.02 (3) (1947); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §491.060 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§93-701-4 (3) (1947); NEB.REV. STAT. §25-1201,
1206 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. §48.070 (1957);
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ever, despite the Phillips case, the courts
have generally accepted the post-Restoration English view."
Dean Wigmore states four fundamental
conditions as being essential to the estab-

lishment of a privileged communication:
(1)

12

The communications must originate

in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relationshipmust be one which
in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered; and
(4) The harm that would inure to the relationship by the disclosure of the communications must be greaterthan the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.

The judges in the present case restated
these principles and found no difficulty in
applying them to the facts involved. 13 Dean
Wigmore suggests that it was the third condition which was not satisfied at common
law and that "[Iln a state where toleration
of religions exists by law, and where a substantial part of the community professes
a religion practicing a confessional sysN. J. REV. STAT. §2A: 81-9 (1951); N. M. STAT.
ANN. §20-1-12 (c) (1953); N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
§351; N. D. REV. CODE §31-0106 (1943); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN.§2317.02 (Baldwin 1958); OKLA.
STAT. ANN.tit. 12 §385(5) (Supp. 1958); ORE.

REV. STAT. §44.040 (1957); S. C. CODE §56-861
(Supp. 1959); S.D. CODE §36.0101 (1939); TENN.
CODE ANN. §24-109-11 (Supp. 1959); UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-24-8 (3)

(1953); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 12

§1607 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE §5.60.060 (3)
(1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4992 (d) (1955);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §325.20 (-1958); WYO. STAT.
ANN.§1-139 (2) (1957).
11 State v. Morehous, 95 N. J. L. 285, 117 Atl.
296 (1922). See Commonwealth v. Drake, 15
Mass. 163 (1818); Barnes v. State, 199 Miss. 86,
23 So. 2d 405 (1945) (dictum).
12 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§2285 (3d ed. 1940).

13 See Mullen v. United States, 263 F. 2d 275,
279-80 (D. C. Cir. 1958) (concurring opinion).
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14

this condition is fulfilled. How-

ever, it is proposed that if a fundamental
freedom is involved it is immaterial whether
that part of the community practicing a
confessional system is "substantial" or numerically insignificant.
It has been suggested that the view of the
English common law was the product of
intolerance towards the religion which enforced a confessional system, 15 rather than
a proper application of principles of law. 16
This very aptly points out in an historic
perspective the relation of the privilege to
our tradition of religious freedom.
The types of communication protected
by the privilege vary with statutory language and with judicial interpretation. Not
all communications to clergymen are entitled to this protection.
The New York statute which reads:
[A] clergyman, or other minister of religion, shall not be allowed to disclose a
confession made to him, in his professional
character, in the course of discipline, enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs . . 17
is similar to that of many jurisdictions.' 8
No New York cases have been found adequately construing it,19 but many of the
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 849-50 (3d ed. 1940).
15 See Cook v. Carroll, [1945] Ir. R. 515, 521
14

(dictum).
16 See the Phillipscase as reported in I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 199 (1955).
17

N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §351.

18 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE. ANN. §9-203 (1948);
IOWA CODE ANN. §622.10 (1950); N. D. REV.
CODE §31-0106 (1943); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§2317.02 (Baldwin 1958);

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

12 §385 (5) (Supp. 1958).

19

In People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311 (N. Y. 1836),

the court merely recited the predecessor statute, [2
R. S. 406, Sec. 72 (1829)] and stated that the admissions are not in the course of discipline. Defendant had falsely submitted a bond to the

other states have construed such laws
strictly. 20 It has been held that the statute
does not apply unless the confession is
made pursuant to a duty enjoined by the
21
rules of practice of the particular church.
Other courts have not been as strict, but
the element of penitential confession has
been required in almost all cases. 22 In the
Swenson 23 case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had to deal with a similarly strict
statute. That court indicated that not all
religions have confessions and that it is
very uncommon outside the Catholic religion for there to be any similar duty or
obligation involved. The court reasoned that
the legislature did not intend to benefit
only Catholics, and so promulgated a liberal
definition of the required relationship. It
was necessary only that the defendant, seeking spiritual advice, aid or comfort, speak
to the witness in his professional character
as a clergyman, with confidence that the
conversation would be secret and that the
24
disclosures were penitential in nature.
An interesting and broad interpretation
of the privilege was applied in an Irish
case, which like the present one, was not
minister for his signature, with intent to defraud
the church. See also People v. Shapiro, 308 N. Y.
453, 458, 126 N.E. 2d 559, 561-62 (1955), which
suggests by way of dictum that such statutes are
construed liberally. In that case the court was
discussing the attorney-client privilege. See also
N. Y. City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N. Y. 296,
31 N.E. 2d 31 (1940) (dictum).
20 See, e.g., Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279
S.W. 353 (1926); Alford v. Johnson, 103 Ark.
236, 146 S.W. 516 (1912); Estate of Toomes, 54
Cal. 509 (1880); State v. Morgan, 196 Mo. 177,
95 S.W. 402 (1906).
21 Sherman v. State, supra note 20, State v. Morgan, supra note 20.
22 See, e.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237
N.W. 589 (1931).
23 Ibid.
24 Supra note 22 at __, 237 N.W. at 591.

5

based on statute. 25 In that case a priest
unsuccessfully attempted to mediate in an
impending paternity suit. When he was
called as a witness he refused to testify. The
court refused to follow the common law,
stating that it was founded on a sectarian
principle to which it did not adhere. 20 The
conversation was held to be privileged and
the priest was found innocent of contempt.
As corollary dictum it was stated that the
privilege could not be waived without the
consent of all the parties. 27 Wigmore's four
conditions were cited favorably and found
to apply. The court said that the communications were made with the understanding
that they would be kept secret and that
secrecy was essential to the confidence. The
court thought that
[T]he community thoroughly appreciates
the value of the relation and wishes it to be
preserved and fostered for the common
weal. 2' As to the fourth condition . . . we
should lose far more in the parish . . .than

we could hope to gain in litigation by informing our parish priests that an Irish
Court cannot recognise the sanctity of the

hallowed confidences exchanged in such a
colloquy ....21

Not all statutes are as strict as the type

exemplified by New York law. For instance,
after the lower court discussion in the
Swenson case, but before the appeal, the
heretofore strict Minnesota statute was
25 Cook v. Carroll [1945], Ir. R. 515.
26 Id. at 519.
27 Id. at 523-24. Compare N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT

§354, "The last four sections apply to any examination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived upon the trial
examination by the person confessing .. .
28 Cook v. Carroll [1945], Ir. R. 515, 521.
29

Id. at 522. It would appear that Wigmore would

disagree with this interpretation of his conditions.
See the comment on Minnesota's statute in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2395 n. I (3d ed. 1940).
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. nor shall a clergy-

man or other minister of any religion be
examined as to any communication made to
him by any person seeking religious or
spiritual advice, aid, or comfort or his
advice given thereon in the course of his
professional character, without the consent
of such person." '30 Such a statute would
seem to eliminate the problems involved in
defining the phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of
the religious body." A statute passed in
Florida this May has similarly broad wording, 31 and might, considering the present

32
case, indicate a trend.
While the recognition of the privilege
rests firmly on the principles, if not on the
clear authorities, of the common law, an
interesting argument may be proposed on
constitutional grounds.33 By admitting such
evidence an essential religious function is
endangered. It may be strongly argued that
this is an interference with the penitent's
freedom of religion, 34 and further it may
be questioned whether a priest may be
compelled to violate his conscience and
sacred duty.
Whether founded on policy or on constitutional grounds, it is proposed that communications to a clergyman in his professional character are deserving of privilege.
It is essential that the courts accord a
proper respect to such sacred and essentially secret personal disclosures when made
in the religious forum.

30 MINN. STAT. ANN. §595.02 (3) (1947).

31 FLA. LAWS 1959, ch. 144.
32 For other similarly broad statutes see, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. §38-419.1

(1953);

MD. ANN. CODE

art. 35, §13 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. §25-1206
(1956); N. M. STAT. ANN. §20-1-12 (c) (1953).
33 See U. S. CONST. amend. I.
34 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 199 (1955).
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Supervision of Deportalde Aliens
In Siminofi v. Esperdy,1 the petitioners,
deportable aliens, challenged the validity of
an order of supervision issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Petitioners sought to enjoin the immigration
officials from requiring compliance with the
order, hereinafter referred to as Provision
(3). This provision, issued pursuant to the
authority granted in 8 U.S.C. §1252 (d)
(4),2 required:
That said alien shall not travel outside New
York District, 3 without furnishing written
notice to the Asst. District Director for Deportation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . .of the places to which he

intends to travel and the dates of such travel,
at least 48 hours prior to beginning the
travel unless that Immigration Officer grants
him written permission to begin the travel
before the expiration of the 48-hour notice
4
period.

In reversing the holding of Siminoff v.
MurfJ,5 the Court held that Provision (3)

exceeded the authority conferred by section
1 267 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1959).
2 Immigration and Nationality Act §242 (d), 66
Stat. 208, 211 (1952) (amended by 68 Stat. 1232
(1954), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1252 (d) (4)
(1958). This section provides in part: "Any alien,
against whom a final order of deportation ... has

been outstanding for more than six months, shall,
pending eventual deportation, be subject to su-

pervision under regulations prescribed by the
Attorney General. Such regulations shall include
provisions which will require any alien subject to
supervision ...(4) to conform to such reasonable

written restrictions on his conduct or activities as
are prescribed by the Attorney General in his
case."
3 The New York District includes New York City
and only those suburban counties adjacent thereto
which are within the State of New York. Siminoff
v. Esperdy, 267 F. 2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1959).
4 Id. at 707.
5 164 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. N. Y. 1958), rev'd sub
nom. Siminoff v. Esperdy, 267 F 2d 705 (2d Cir.
1959).

1252 (d) (4) 1 because it was unreasonable.
Before the District Court attempted a
determination of the reasonableness of Provision (3), it explored the purpose for
which the authorizing statute was framed.
The Court ascertained that section 1252
(d) was designed only to guarantee avail7
ability for deportation of deportable aliens.
It has been intimated that in limiting the
statute to this singular purpose grave constitutional issues were avoided.8 This primary consideration is a very important factor in distinguishing the lower court and
the appellate court opinions, because it
appears that the Second Circuit ignored
that objective purpose of the statute in favor
of the subjective feelings of the petitioners.
The Second Circuit relied on United
States v. Witkovich and Barton v. Sentner' ° in its justification of a narrow application of section 1252(d) (4). 11 Although
the Court held in the former case that the
statute was to have a limited application as
to clause (3) of subsection (d), 12 this had
no direct bearing on the Siminoff case which
was testing clause (4) of the statute. In the
Sentner case the limitations are placed in
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Siminoff v. Murff, 164 F. Supp. 34, 37 (S. D.
N. Y. 1958).
8 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U. S. 194, 199
(1957). See also 70 HARV. L. REV. 718, 719
(1957).
9 Supra note 8.
10 353 U. S. 963 (1957) (per curiam).
11 Siminoff v. Esperdy, 267 F. 2d 705, 707 (2d
Cir. 1959).
1266 Stat. 208, 211 (1952)
(as amended by 68
Stat. 1232 (1954), as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1252
(d) (3) (1958)). This section requires deportable
aliens subject to supervision "(3) to give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and
such other information, whether or not related to
the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem
fit and proper." Ibid.

5

relation to clause (4). There the District
Court was concerned with an order of supervision, composed of ten restrictions, issued by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service pursuant to clause (4) .'. One restriction, that was held valid, required a
48-hour notice prior to change of residence
and an application for permission for all
trips outside the State of Missouri.' 4 Though
the latter provision seems wider in geographic scope than the New York provision,
it is significant that they are nevertheless
so similar that the final determinations seem
somewhat inconsistent.
The concurring opinion in the Siminoff
case implies two defects of bmission in the
Second Circuit's determination of the reasonableness of Provision (3). Circuit Judge
Waterman alludes first to the special travel
privileges which had been granted to one
of the petitioners by the Service. 15 This
stresses the flexibility that is inherent in
Provision (3) and which the Court seems
to disregard. Secondly, the concurring opinion reveals the administrative difficulties
that will result from a decision declaring
Provision (3) unrea -onable. The difficulties
would stem from. the necessary broadening
of geographic limitations which would disturb the authority and the facility of working within established district lines. 16
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Judge Dawson, in the District Court
opinion, made a probing, analytical study
of the problem before him and in so doing,
arrived at a precise determination of the
issue. He approached the question of reasonableness from its specific and general
aspects and considered these points:
1. Is Provision (3) adapted to the purpose
of the authorizing statute? The answer
was in the affirmative because it satisfied
the necessary supervision purpose of the
17
statute.
2. Is Provision (3) flexible? Again the answer was yes, as clearly evidenced by
the freedom of travel granted to petitioner, Young, and the proposed leniency towards the other petitioners.18
3. Is the status of the persons a necessary
factor? This answer is affirmative insofar
as it relates to the purpose and the validity of the authorizing statute. 19 Congress
has the power to order the deportation
of aliens it considers hurtful 20 and, a
fortiori, it must have legislative power to
supervise aliens so ordered. 21
4. Should the hardship suffered by the petitioners be determinative of the reasonableness of Provision (3)? Here the District Court was careful to consider the
difficulties encountered by a rule involving time and geographic elements, but
implied that this notion of hardship,
alone, could-not be the controlling factor in determining the reasonableness of
22
a rule.
Yet the Second Circuit seized upon this

13 Sentner v. Colarelli, 145 F. Supp. 569 (E.D.

Mo. 1956), aff'd sub non. Barton v. Sentner, 353
U. S. 963 (1957) (per curiam).
14 Sentner v. Colarelli, supra note 13, at 573.
The court in interpreting "permission," in effect,
equated it with "notice" because such "permission"
could not be withheld by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service without (1) questioning the
justiciability of the restriction itself and (2) raising serious constitutional doubts concerning the
restriction. Ibid.
15

Siminoff v. Esperdy, 267 F. 2d 705, 708 (2d

Cir. 1959).
16 Ibid.

17 Siminoff v. Murff, 164 F. Supp. 34, 40 (S. D.
N. Y. 1958), rev'd sub norn. Siminoff v. Esperdy,
267 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1959).
18 Id. at 39, n. 3.
"I' Id. at 40.
20 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 536
(1952); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 280

(1922). Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591
(1913).
Supra note 17.
Siminoff v. Murff, 164 F. Supp. 34, 39 (S. D.
N. Y. 1958), rev'd sub norn. Siminoff v. Esperdy,
267 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1959).
21

22
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notion of hardship and harassment and the
following perplexing query was raised:
Would not any supervisory order which
was directed at keeping a party available
for deportation be a grave hardship to that
person? The shadow of deportation constantly hovering over a person must, of necessity, be burdensome, discouraging and
harassing.
Leaving aside the reasonableness of Provision (3), a model provision might be
suggested. The Second Circuit, outside of
its judiciai function, suggested that a notice
mailed immediately prior to a trip and applicable only to trips of some considerable
23
distance and time would be satisfactory.
This suggestion would leave little control
over the movements of deportable aliens.
Perhaps Provision (3) would be more acceptable with an amendment to the final
section which now reads, ". . . unless the
Immigration Officer grants him written permission to begin the travel before the ex'2 4
piration of the 48-hour notice period. "
That section might better read, ". .. except
that the Immigration Officer must grant him
permission to begin the travel before the
expiration of the 48-hour period, where the
petitioner's motive for travel is consistent
with the purpose of the statute." This
amendment should satisfy the courts because it retains the flexibility of Provision
(3) while eliminating the harassment and
difficulty of economic and social travel restrictions.
There is an incidental note raised in the
District Court concerning the right to travel
as qualified by Provision (3). The importance of this note is the relative quality of
the right to travel. In the natural law, the
2.3 Siminoff v. Esperdy, 267 F. 2d 705, 707 (2d

Cir. 1959).
24 Ibid.

right is referred to as "locomotion" and it is
subject to the limitation of "forfeiture of
exercise as the equal rights of others and
the demands of the common good . .
reasonably indicate." '25 Kent v. Dulles,26 a
recent Supreme Court decision, reiterated
the basic liberty and freedom of travel as
protected by the Constitution. In that case
the Court discusses curtailment of the right
to travel especially in the area of national
emergencies, but does not decide or even
suggest to what extent this curtailment may
be exercised. 27 Thus it appears that the restriction of the petitioner's right to travel is,
at least on its face, valid in both the natural
law and the civil law areas.
Taken as a whole, the record of the
Siminofj case dramatically points out the
difficulty and arbitrariness of a test of reasonableness. The significance of this difficulty is further impressed upon us by the
Second Circuit's attempt to narrow that test
to a specific consideration, i.e., harassment
and hardship. The test of reasonableness is
a Joseph's coat with many individual facets
contributing to the final product. 28 It is submitted that the District Court, recognizing
this principle, applied it and reached the
correct determination of the reasonableness
of Provision (3).
Regulation of Contingent Fees
of Attorneys
In the recent case of Gair v. Peck,1 the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the
25

Kenealy,. Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
263-64 (Oct. 1955).
116 (1958), 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER

LAWYER 259,
26357 U. S.

363 (Autumn 1958).
27 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 124, 127 (1958).
28 FORKOSCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 643 (1956).
1 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 160 N.E. 2d 43, 188 N.Y.S. 2d
491 (1959).

5
validity of Rule 4,2 promulgated by the
Appellate Division, First Department, regulating contingent fees which attorneys may
charge in personal injury claims and wrongful death actions. This Rule, adopted in
1956, is the first attempt by a New York
court to regulate such matters.

4. The relevant portions of this rule are as follows:
"Rule 4. Contingent Fees in Claims and Actions
for Personal Injury and Wrongful Death.
(a) In any claim or action for personal injury
or wrongful death, whether determined by judgment or settlement, in which the compensation of
claimant's or plaintiff's attorneys is contingent,
that is, dependent in whole or in part upon the
amount of the recovery, the receipt, retention or
sharing by such attorneys, pursuant to agreement
or otherwise, of compensation which is equal to
or less than the fees scheduled below is deemed
to be fair and reasonable. The receipt, retention
or sharing of compensation which is in excess of
such scheduled fees shall constitute the exaction
of unreasonable and unconscionable compensation in violation of Canons 12 and 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the New York
State Bar Association, unless authorized by a
written order of the court as hereinafter provided.
(b) The following is the schedule of reasonable
fees referred to above: either,
[Part] (1)
(A) Fifty per cent. on the first one thousand
dollars of the sum recovered,
(B) Forty per cent. on the next two thousand
dollars of the sum recovered,
(C) Thirty-five per cent. on the next twenty-two
thousand dollars of the sum recovered,
(D) Twenty-five per cent. on any amount over
twenty-five thousand dollars of the sum recovered;
or
[Part] (2)
A percentage not exceeding thirty-three and a
third per cent. of the sum recovered, if the initial
contractual arrangement between the client and
the attorneys so provides, in which event the procedure hereinafter provided for making application for additonal compensation because of extraordinary circumstances shall not apply.
(c) Such percentages shall be computed on the
net sum recovered after deducting taxable costs
and disbursements, and expenses for legal, medi2 1ST DEP'T SPECIAL RULE
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As far back as 1879 the New York State
Bar Association had become aware of the
abuses arising from the contingent fee, 3 and
in 1908 the Association published a report
specifying these abuses.4 Section (4) of this

cal, investigative, or other services properly
chargeable to the claim or action. But for the following or similar items there shall be no deduction in computing such percentages: Liens, assignments or claims in favor of hospitals, treating
doctors, nurses, self-insurers or insurance carriers.
(d) In the event that claimant's or plaintiff's
attorneys believe in good faith that the foregoing
schedule (1), because of extraordinary circumstances, will- not give them adequate compensation, application for greater compensation may be
made upon affidavit with written notice and an
opportunity to be heard to the client and other
persons holding liens or assignments on the recovery. Such application shall be made to the justice
of the trial part to which the action had been sent
for trial; or, if it had not been sent to a part for
trial, then to the justice presiding at the Trial Term
Calendar part of the court in which the action
had been instituted; or, if no action had been instituted, then to the justice presiding at the Trial
Term Calendar part of the Supreme Court for the
county in the First Judicial Department in which
the attorneys filing the statement of retainer, pursuant to Rule 4-A, have an office. Upon such application, the justice in his discretion, if extraordinary
circumstances are found to be present, and without
regard to the claimant's or plaintiff's consent, may
fix as reasonable compensation for legal services
rendered an amount greater. than that specified in
the foregoing schedule (1), provided, however,
that such greater amount shall not exceed the fee
fixed pursuant to the contractual arrangement, if
any, between the client and the attorneys. If the
application be granted, the justice shall make a
written order accordingly, briefly stating the reasons for granting the greater compensation; and a
copy of such order shall be served on all persons
entitled to receive notice of the application."
3 3 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 134-43 (1879). In

an essay read to the Bar the author pointed out
that contingent fee contracts were bringing the
practice of law "more closely akin to a trade,
rather than the noble, high-minded, honorable
and elevating profession it was once considered
to be." Id. at 135.
4 31 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 119-24 (1908).
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report was entitled "Exorbitant Charges,"
and stated:
For the first two or three decades after the
legalization of the contingent fee, percentages were moderate, fifteen per cent. or
twenty per cent. of the recovery was considered reasonable. These have grown until
forty per cent. is common, fifty per cent. is
not unusual, and sixty per cent. has been
known to have been charged. 5 .
Today in the First Department 60 per
cent of the 150,000 contingent fee retainers
filed yearly provide that the attorney receive
50 per cent of the recovery. 6 Thus, as "a
means of investigating and checking what it
deems to be an improper professional practice in the great majority of instances where
it occurs," Rule 4 was enacted by the
First Department.
The Rule permits an attorney to make
either one of two contingent fee contracts
with his client in personal injury and wrongful death cases. Part (1) of the schedule
provides that he may charge his client according to the scale of percentages provided
by the court, and thus at the end of litigation he may apply for additional compensation if extraordinary circumstances give rise
to the justification of a higher fee. Part (2)
provides that the attorney may charge his
client a straight 333 per cent, and in such
case he has no opportunity to apply for
additional compensation at the end of litigation should a higher fee be required. Failure to comply with these provisions constitutes the exaction of unreasonable and
unconscionable compensation in violation
of Canons 12 and 13 of the Canons of Pro5 Id. at 121.
6 Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 102, 160 N.E. 2d 43,
52, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 491, 502 (1959).
7Id. at 112, 160 N.E. 2d at 52, 188 N.Y.S. 2d at
502.

fessional Ethics of the New York State Bar
Association.
Following the promulgation of Rule 4
a group of attorneys within the jurisdiction
of the First Department brought an action
for a declaratory judgment, alleging that
the First Department lacked the power to
adopt the Rule. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the attorneys in the New York
County Special Term. 8 The Rule was declared invalid on the grounds that it was
inconsistent with section 474 of the Judiciary Law, and that the Appellate Division
lacked the power of discipline over attorneys regarding excessive fees except in the
individual case and after the misconduct has
occurred. This judgment was affirmed by
the Appellate Division, Third Department. 9
However, on May 28, 1959, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
holding by sustaining Rule 4.10
The specific issue presented in the case
was whether or not the Rule is within the
rule-making power of the Appellate Division. The majority opinion indicated that
court control over attorneys was well esiablished at early common law," expressly recognized by the first New York State Constitution,'12 and presently provided for by
section 90 of the New York Judiciary
Law. 13 This court control is approved by
8 Gair v. Peck, 6 Misc. 2d 739, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 247
(Sup. Ct. 1957).
9 Gair v. Peck, 5 A.D. 2d 303, 171 N.Y.S. 2d 594
(3d Dep't 1958).
10 Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 160 N.E. 2d 43, 188
N.Y.S. 2d 491 (1959).
11 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y.
465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928), for a discussion of the
early English origins of this concept.
12 N.Y. CONST. §27 (1777) provided: "...
all attorneys, solicitors, and counsellors at law . . .
[shall] be regulated by the rules and orders of the
said courts."
13

N.Y.

JUDICIARY

.LAw §90 provides:

"...

The
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Canon 13 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics which
specifically provides for supervision by the
courts over contingent fees. 14 New York
courts have on occasion exercised such supervision in passing upon the reasonableness of contingent fees. 15
Section 83 of the Judiciary Law gives the
Appellate Division the power to make
special rules "not inconsistent with any statute or rule of civil practice." 1 6 Rule 4 was
passed as a result of this power of the
Appellate Division, in an attempt to extend
the already indicated disciplinary authority
of the courts over attorneys. The only question remaining is whether Rule 4 is "inconsistent with any statute,"' 7 namely section
474 of the Judiciary Law providing that
"the compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied."'

In an action

under section 474, a contingent fee con-

appellate division of the supreme court in each de.partment is authorized to censure, suspend from
practice or remove from office any attorney and
counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is
guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice,
fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial- to the administration of justice. . ."
14 Canon 13 provides: "A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
15 Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 152 N.E. 696
(1926); See, e.g., Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights
R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 78 N.E. 179 (1906); Matter
of Fitzsimons, 174 N.Y. 15, 66 N.E. 554 (1903);
Matter of Friedman, 136 App. Div. 750, 121
N.Y.S. 426 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 199 N.Y. 537, 92
N.E. 1085 (1910).
16 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §83.

Ibid.
Is N.Y. JUDICIARY
17

LAW
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tract as high as 50 per cent has been enforced by the New York courts since it was
considered reasonable under the circumstances. 19
The majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals reasoned that, even though Rule
4 does not allow attorneys to contract for
a straight 50 per cent fee, the Rule does
not violate section 474 since it allows an
attorney to apply for additional compensation above the set percentages if extraordinary services are rendered by him. Thus,
although an arbitrary fee of 50 per cent is
considered unreasonable under the Rule,
upon a proper showing that the circumstance require greater compensation, fees
as high as 50 per cent will nevertheless be
sustained. As a result the Court stated that
Rule 4 is not inconsistent with section 474
of the Judiciary Law since those prior cases,
where 50 per cent fees have been sustained
under section 474, would receive indirectly
the same result. The only change under Rule
4 is that now the attorney has the burden
of proving to the court that a higher fee is
justified. This procedure attempts to reduce
the charging of unreasonable fees through
an orderly administration of the court's admitted supervisory power over attorneys.
The dissenting opinions of the Court of
Appeals took the position that the arbitrary
setting of percentage fees and the presumption of unconscionable conduct on the part
of the attorney for failure to comply with
these percentages as established by Rule 4
impairs the attorney's freedom of contract
as is provided under section 474. The
power to make such change in the law, it
is contended, rests only with the Legisla19 Ward v. Orsini, supra note 15. Accord, More-

house v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. supra note 15;
Matter of Fitzsimons, supra note 15.
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ture, and such legislation cannot come from
any judicial source.
Both the majority and dissent in Gair v.
Peck20 have considered the First Department's power to adopt Rule 4 in its entirety.
The majority purports to sustain the whole
rule, while the dissent completely rejects it.
However, upon a reading of Rule 4 it appears that the reasoning of the majority
only justifies part (1) of the schedule, while
the dissent presents a strong argument in
opposition to part (2).
The majority held that contingent fees
as high as those justly enforced under section 474 will still be sustained under Rule
4, since the attorney has the right to apply
for additional compensation if at the end
of litigation it is due him. However, it should
be noted that this right to additional compensation is only granted by Rule 4 when
the attorney contracts according to part (1)
of the schedule (the scale of percentages
based on the amount of recovery). If the
attorney should contract according to part
(2), for a straight contingent fee not exceeding 33
per cent, he will not be allowed to apply for additional compensation
should it be due him at the end of litigation.
Part (2) states: "the procedure hereinafter
provided for making application for additional compensation because of extraordinary circumstances shall not apply."' 2 1 Thus,
part (2) of the schedule makes contingent
fee contracts above 33
per cent unreasonable as a matter of law. This apparently
violates section 474 of the Judiciary Law
since, as the dissenting opinions point out,
contingent fees as high as 50 per cent have
been enforced under this section. 22 The
20

6 N.Y. 2d 97, 160 N.E. 2d 43, 188 N.Y.S. 2d

491 (1959).
21 1ST DEP'T SPECIAL RULE
22

See note 19 supra.

4. (Emphasis added.)

First Department's rule-making power does
not extend to rules which are "inconsistent
with any statute, '23 and thus it would seem
that part (2) of the schedule of Rule 4 is
24
invalid.
It appears that the Court of Appeals'
construction of Rule 4 either fails to take
into account or is in conflict with that clause
of part (2) of the schedule which prohibits
the attorney from seeking additional compensation. Despite this apparent conflict, as
the Rule stands now after this judicial
construction, "the way is left open in any
case" 25 for an attorney to come before the
First Department, and upon a full showing
of all the facts and circumstances he may
establish that the percentages stipulated by
the First Department do not apply to his
particular case. In such a case, the Gair decision holds that the court will permit the
attorney to charge a fee above the stipulated
percentages.
The Court's failure to give specific treatment to part (2) of the schedule is quite
perplexing. However, it appears evident
from the Court's reasoning that where contingent fees are regulated by a court to prevent excessive charges, there must also be
provision made for the attorney who ren(continued on page 358)
23
24

N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §83.
It is also interesting to note that part (2) is in

conflict with an opinion expressed by the First
Department itself. In 1950, the First Department
in Buckley v. Surface Transp. Corp., 277 App.
Div. 224, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 576 (1st Dep't 1950) (per
curiam), stated that the fixing of fees should take
into consideration "the nature and amount of the
services rendered and the amount of the recovery."
id. at 226, 98 N.Y.S. 2d at 578. These factors can
only be known at the end of litigation for which
part (2) of the schedule makes'no provision.
25 Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 113, 160 N.E. 2d 43,
52, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 491, 503 (1959). (Emphasis
added.)
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August issue of the ABA Journal? I am
still very anxious to get an article in THE
CATHOLIC LAWYER. Is there some phase
or area of this problem I could submit for
publication? I am keeping up with the decisions and the legislatures of all 50 states.
Sister Ann Joachim, 0. P.
Siena Heights College
See In other Publications; this issue.
SUFFERN, NEW YORK

To the Editor:
If you have a bibliography for books on
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(continued)
ders extraordinary services to obtain additional compensation. The fact that "attorneys owe a duty to uphold the honor of
their profession and to aid any effort under
the direction of the court to root out corruption and fraud,"'26 does not give a court
the right to unduly burden the attorney's income. 27 Cases may be tried, retried and ap26 In the Matter of Becker, 229 App. Div. 62, 73,
241 N.Y. Supp. 369, 381 (1st Dep't 1930).
27 It is to be noted that "the American Bar Asso-

ciation .

.

. has published studies indicating that

compensation for attorneys has not increased correspondingly over these inflationary years as has
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the subject of ethics for THE CATHOLIC
LAWYER, I would be most appreciative if
you would so advise me.
Robert J. Stolarik

The four-volume standard authority on
moral theology, Priimmer, has recently appeared in English in a one-volume compendium entitled Handbook of Moral Theology. It will be reviewed in an early issue
of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.

pealed, in addition to other unexpected and
time-consuming obligations prior to obtaining a judgment. The attorney assumes all
these obligations under the contingent fee
contract at the risk of obtaining no recovery at all. The fact that it may be a rare
case where a fee as high as 50 per cent
is warranted is no reason why an attorney
in such a case should not be protected. It
is apparent from the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Rule 4 that the fairness as
well as the effectiveness of the Rule will
depend upon the liberality of the First
Department in granting the additional
amount of compensation to attorneys who
justly deserve it.
the remuneration of other professions as medicine
and dentistry." Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y. 2d 97, 117,
160 N.E. 2d 43,55,188 N.Y.S. 2d 491,507 (1959).

